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Abstract 
This thesis estimates how wages at Estonian firms are affected by foreign acquisition. 
Using Estonian firm-level data spanning from 1995-2018, I utilize propensity score matching 
and standard fixed effects to complete this treatment analysis. By separating the data into three 
distinct eras, I estimate that the foreign wage premium has decreased by approximately 5%. 
Compared to domestically owned firms, Estonian firms acquired by a foreign entity between 
2010-2018 have a wage difference of approximately 9% after two years. This wage disparity 
is largely seen in those firms specializing in knowledge-intensive services, an industry seldom 
examined for wage gap disparity until this thesis; this thesis seeks to improve upon the existent 
literature on this wage difference and contribute further analysis regarding foreign acquired 
versus domestic Estonian firms in the services industries.  
Keywords: foreign direct investment, treatment analysis, propensity score matching 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to receive persistent attention with its decline 
due to the global pandemic and protectionist policies. With less FDI, workers will likely bear 
a burden of wages not rising to the same extent as before. The standard narrative is that foreign-
owned firms pay their workers higher wages due to higher productivity (Aitken et al., 1996; 
Hale & Long, 2011). This paper estimates the relationship between foreign ownership and 
wages using Estonian establishment-level data.  
The complication of studying the firm’s effects of inward FDI stems from the problem 
of endogeneity (Hale & Long, 2011). Since this study cannot randomly assign the treatment of 
being a foreign-owned firm, I am forced to create a research design to address the selection 
bias of foreign investors. One way to address this problem is to utilize instrumental variables. 
The categorical variable determining foreign ownership is instrumented with variables 
correlated with FDI but not the error term (Hale & Long, 2011). In practice, the instrumental 
variables approach is difficult due to the complexity of finding adequate instruments that do 
not correlate with the error term. I attempt to address endogeneity to some extent by using 
propensity score matching (PSM) and standard fixed effects. Using this combination, I can 
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Therefore, I estimate what the 
wages of foreign firms would have been without receiving FDI and take the difference between 
the actual and counterfactual to obtain the ATT.   
The Estonian Business Registry provides firm characteristics, such as wages, location, 
sector, and capital intensity, between 1995-2018. A benefit of using Estonian data is that I 
include the services sector in my analysis. The importance of FDI in the services sector has 
grown in recent years, especially in transition economies because they have underdeveloped 
non-tradable sectors (Köllő et al., 2021). According to Varblane et al. (2020), the type of FDI 
inflow into Estonia has changed over the years. To capture the change in inward FDI targeting, 
I will split the study into multiple subperiods based on two key developments in the Estonian 
economy: the accession of Estonia to the European Union and the global financial crisis. I 
present estimations of the foreign ownership’s effect on wages for the periods 1995-2018, 
1995-2003, 2004-2009, and 2010-2018. Additionally, I use the Statistical Classification of 
Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE Rev.2) to segregate the firms into 
four groups based on their technological intensity for the manufacturing sector and their 
knowledge intensity for the services sector. These four groups are low-technology, high-
technology, less knowledge-intensive, and knowledge-intensive.  
After controlling for the covariates to make the treatment assignment relatively arbitrary 
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through nearest-neighbor matching, I find that one year after a firm becomes majority foreign-
owned, the firm pays approximately 14% higher wages during the entire period of 1995-2018 
without breaking the study into different eras. This difference is seen predominately in the 
foreign low-technology manufacturers and less knowledge-intensive services. By contrast, 
separating the analysis into three distinct eras shows that the smallest wage premium for being 
acquired by a foreign firm is the last era of 2010-2018, approximately 7.3% for one year after 
acquisition. This difference is driven by the foreign wage premium in the knowledge-intensive 
services.  
This study is presented as follows: Section 2 presents key literature in the area of FDI 
and wages; Section 3 describes the methodology; Section 4 presents a short data overview; 
Section 5 reports the results of the standard fixed effects and PSM; Section 6 discusses the 
implications of the study; Section 7 concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review 
This paper focuses on FDI’s effect of foreign investment on employee wages in foreign-
owned firms. Since foreign firms lack knowledge of the local market, the advantages of the 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) must outweigh their “foreignness” relative to the local 
enterprises (Dunning, 1977). The MNEs will invest conditional on ownership, location, and 
internalization (Dunning, 1979). If the MNE possesses an intangible asset like a patent or work 
culture, the foreign firm can overcome that disadvantage. For example, Coca-Cola utilizes 
horizontal foreign direct investment to produce its soft drinks in Estonia to sell to the Estonian 
market. By opting for this FDI, Coca-Cola protects the quality and recipe while saving on costly 
shipping costs. The same advantages that enabled the MNE to enter the market led to 
measurable benefits over the local firms (Girma & Görg, 2007; Taylor & Driffield, 2005). 
Theoretically, the influx of capital results in higher wages due to the increase in labor 
productivity. Therefore, the foreign-owned firms who perform better than the domestic-owned 
firms will also pay higher relative wages, ceteris paribus (Aitken et al., 1996; Feliciano & 
Lipsey, 2006; Girma et al., 2001; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004). 
According to Malchow-Møller et al. (2013), theories explaining the wage premium in 
foreign firms can be grouped into three categories: worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, 
and heterogeneity in the learning opportunities. Worker heterogeneity means that the higher 
wages at the MNE relative to the domestic firm stem from the selection bias of the foreign firm 
to “cherry-pick” the more productive workers. Similarly, the unique characteristics of the 
foreign firm, such as working conditions, could also result in the wage premium; meanwhile, 
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worker preferences for local firms could also force foreign firms to pay a premium (Lipsey, 
2004; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004). Lastly, workers who have access to better training in foreign 
firms will become more productive (Görg et al., 2007). As they become more productive, 
foreign firms will increase their workers’ wages to prevent domestic firms from poaching 
workers who have increased their human capital. 
Studies often draw an important distinction between developed and developing 
economies because the host country’s labor market structure usually alters the findings. Using 
an empirical macro approach, Figini and Görg (2011) demonstrate that without segregating the 
countries into different levels of development, the results are biased (Blonigen & Wang, 2005). 
Hence, the division of countries into OECD and non-OECD proposed by Figini and Görg 
(2011) is well-founded. This division supports the approach of this paper’s separation of the 
period of 1995-2018 into different eras in Estonia because Estonia went from a non-OECD 
member to an OECD member in 2010 (OECD, 2012). Furthermore, Estonia’s accession to the 
European Union saw a greater inflow of FDI (Durán, 2019). Therefore, I separate the time 
period studied into three subperiods of 1995-2003, 2004-2009, and 2010-2018, which coincide 
with these two important developments in the Estonian economy.   
To better understand the methods of analyzing the effects of FDI, it is imperative to 
focus on case studies spanning over three decades. Using cross-sectional analysis, Aitken et al. 
(1996) research the wage differentials between foreign firms and domestic firms for Mexico, 
Venezuela, and the United States in the manufacturing sector. According to these findings, 
MNEs in all three countries pay higher wages on average than their domestic counterparts. Yet, 
Aitken et al. (1996) find that the host countries’ different characteristics play a role in the 
effects of inward FDI since the United States also experienced higher domestic wages on 
average after a foreign firm entered the market. Howenstine and Zeile (1994) assert that the 
wage differentials for this 1987 U.S. data, which Aitken et al. (1996) use, arise from the larger 
average size and higher productivity of the foreign-owned firms. Doms and Jensen (1998) 
contribute to this area of study by realizing that the more productive foreign-owned plants pay 
higher wages while being relatively capital intensive than the domestic firms of the United 
States in 1987. Additionally, Doms and Jensen (1998) distinguish that the MNEs originating 
from the United States have the highest productivity compared to any MNE originating outside 
of the country. 
In contrast to Aitken et al. (1996), Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) use 1987 and 1992 U.S. 
data for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) find 
that the low-skill industries, such as manufacturing and retail trade, pay a significant foreign 
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wage premium of 4-6%. According to Köllő et al. (2021), former state-socialist countries have 
underdeveloped non-tradable sectors. Therefore, I utilize this knowledge to assume that the 
services sector will be critical in analyzing FDI’s effect on Estonian wages because the inward 
FDI may be attracted to this sector. Additionally, Köllő et al. (2021) estimate that the wage gap 
between foreign and domestic firms is largest in the Hungarian services sector, 2003-2011. 
While Köllő et al. (2021) add depth to the study of foreign wage premiums, they do not estimate 
the effects of FDI based on different aggregations of services and manufacturing like Feliciano 
and Lipsey (2006). To address this gap to some extent, I allocate firms based on NACE Rev. 2 
at the 2-digit level for compiling aggregates into low-technology manufacturers, high-
technology manufacturers, less knowledge-intensive services, and knowledge-intensive 
services. With this segregation, I attempt to capture the effect of FDI on wages in different 
industries.  
An issue of studying FDI’s effect on wages is the problem of endogeneity, which means 
that FDI is not randomly assigned (Hale & Long, 2011). While studying Chinese firm-level 
data, Hale and Long (2011) utilize instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of FDI. 
The identification of “good instruments” is often elusive because the instruments must be 
correlated with the endogenous regressor for verifiable reasons (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). 
Therefore, Hale and Long (2011) reason that FDI is export-oriented companies in China. 
Another possible way to make an effort to control endogeneity is matching treated units with 
untreated control units and estimating the effect of the treatment. Peluffo (2015) and Girma 
and Görg (2007) use this method as an attempt to remove the selection bias of FDI by matching 
firms that were acquired by a foreign entity with firms that remained domestically owned over 
the same time span. 
The use of fixed effects is another common method to mitigate endogeneity. By 
controlling for each firm’s individual characteristics, Sjöholm and Lipsey (2006) estimate that 
the foreign wage premium reduces by 23% for production-worker wages and 31% for non-
production-worker wages. This same logic can also be applied to the individual characteristics 
of workers. Therefore, firm-level fixed effects control for firm heterogeneity, and worker-level 
fixed effects control for worker heterogeneity. After combining these fixed-effects models with 
propensity score matching, Heyman et al. (2007) estimate that the foreign wage premium for 
foreign takeovers of Swedish firms to be nonexistent. Heyman et al. (2007) also suggest that 
greenfield investments, which are firms originally established as foreign, may have a higher 
foreign wage premium than foreign acquisitions. This assertion may be an interesting notion 
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to investigate, considering the number of greenfield investments has declined since the global 
financial crisis (Durán, 2019).  
According to Dunning (1993), investment motivation is the distinguishing 
characteristic of FDI types. The four categories are natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking (Dunning 1993). An example of natural 
resource-seeking is an MNE investing in a country for its natural resources like raw materials. 
Market-seeking FDI means that the MNEs are trying to enter a new market by investing in the 
host country (Tomohara & Yokota, 2011). When an investor invests for efficiency, the MNE 
wants to utilize the host country’s competitive advantage (Tomohara & Yokota, 2011). Lastly, 
strategic asset-seeking FDI usually takes place via mergers and is motivated by common 
ownership advantages. Besides the type of FDI, the origin of foreign investment can alter the 
effects of inward FDI. According to Tomohara and Yokota (2011), these two aspects of FDI 
work in tandem. While examining establishment-level panel data from 1998-2002 for Thailand, 
Tomohara & Yokota (2011) find that Japanese and Taiwanese FDI into Thailand did not cause 
wage inequality because this FDI increased unskilled labor demand. Since Japan and Taiwan 
already had access to Thailand’s market before this period, this inward FDI is motivated by the 
comparative advantage of the host country, which in Thailand was the relatively cheap 
unskilled labor compared to the home countries. This logic means that this efficiency-seeking 
FDI increased unskilled workers’ wages due to the increased labor demand. Similarly, Girma 
and Görg (2007) discover that FDI’s origins also matter for wages of unskilled and skilled labor 
when studying U.K. firms from 1980 to 1994. According to Girma and Görg (2007), the wages 
of both types of workers increase when a U.S. firm acquires the U.K. firm; yet, no significant 
wage increase occurs when an E.U. firm did the same. Since my study investigates twenty-
three years of Estonian firms, there is a possibility that the country’s comparative advantage 
has changed. Therefore, inward FDI seeking to utilize Estonia’s comparative advantage may 
have shifted from manufacturing to services or to more skill-intensive industries. According to 
Varblane et al. (2021), the rising wages of Estonian workers have reduced the profits of certain 
manufacturing industries, such as textiles. Therefore, I hope to capture this change by 
investigating the three subperiods coupled with firms’ technological intensity and knowledge 
intensity.   
Since Estonia will be the focus of this case study, the past literature regarding the effects 
of FDI in Estonia must be covered. Using the whole population of Estonian firms, Vahter and 
Masso (2007) attempt to discern how inward and outward FDI affect Estonian firms. Vahter 
and Masso (2007) find that the firm receiving or financing the FDI sees related positive 
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productivity. Conversely, the spillover effects of inward and outward FDI are inconclusive and 
likely depend on FDI type. Vahter (2011) uses the entire population of Estonia’s manufacturing 
firms while also implementing Estonian firms’ sample surveys. With this data, Vahter (2011) 
discovers that domestic innovation is associated with increased FDI. Vahter and Masso (2019) 
employ linked Estonian employer-employee data for the entire population of firms from 2006 
to 2014. Using these plentiful data, Vahter and Masso (2019) examines the gender pay gap in 
MNEs and find that FDI is associated with higher wages at the firm, on average. Many of the 
facets discussed about FDI analysis are included in this work, including observing FDI origin. 
When conducting the current study, I plan to build upon these past works of literature. 
According to Dunne et al. (2004), the between-firm component, especially within the same 
industry, is the most prominent aspect affecting wages. Using the latest data on Estonian firms 
at the establishment level, I can estimate the direct effects of inward FDI on wages. 
Additionally, I approximate how the FDI affects different sectors based on the period studied. 
3. Methods 
I attempt to estimate the relationship of a domestic firm becoming a foreign firm in 
Estonia for the period 1995-2018. The economy of Estonia in the late 1990s is different than 
the Estonian economy of the late 2010s (Varblane, 2020). In the 1990s, Estonia received inward 
FDI as a transitioning country (Varblane, 2001). By 2010, the country became a member of the 
OECD (OECD, 2012). Suppose I do not account for the fact that the Estonian economy has 
changed over the period of 1995-2018. In that case, the estimation of FDI’s effect on wages 
may fail to provide useful information. To this end, my estimations are divided into the 
following four eras: 1995-2018, 1995-2003, 2004-2009, and 2010-2018. By completing this 
split, I expect that the estimated effect of FDI on wages to be the largest in the first era where 
Estonian firms’ relatively low labor costs attracted foreign firms in labor-intensive sectors, 
such as the textile industry (Varblane et al., 2008). By the last era, I expect that the industries 
that require high human capital, skilled workers, will see the largest effect of foreign 
acquisition in sectors like ICT (Durán, 2019). Since I plan to estimate this relationship and 
hypothesize that different sectors receive different kinds of FDI, I use NACE Rev. 2 to indicate 
two levels of technology intensity and two levels of knowledge intensity for the manufacturing 
and services sectors, respectively. This division of firms and periods allows me to explore how 
the estimated effect of FDI on wages changes based on time and sector intensity. 
I use the propensity score matching (PSM) and standard fixed effects to estimate the 
relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the real wages of laborers in the 
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period from 1995-2018 for Estonian firms. Using standard fixed effects, I control for time-
invariant firm effects. Adapting the standard fixed effects equation of Wooldridge (2012), I 
estimate Equation (1), where 𝑖 is the firm, 𝑡 is the year, 𝜆𝑡 represents the combined time effects, 
𝛼𝑖 represents the unobserved time-invariant firm effects, 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+1 and 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+2 represent the 
natural logarithm of real wages of a firm per employee for the one-period lead and two-period 
lead after 𝑡, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 represents if a firm is majority foreign-owned, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s age, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of a firm’s number of 
employees, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of a firm’s capital per employee, 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 represents the natural logarithm of real wages of a firm per employee from the 
previous year, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 represents the dummy variable for each industry at the 2-digit NACE 
Rev. 2 level, 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 represents the dummy variable for Northern, Central, North-Eastern, 
Western and Southern Estonia, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+1, 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+2 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝛽+𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝛽+𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁
(1) 
The specification in Equation (1) stems from the interest of studying the effect of foreign 
ownership on wages. According to Doms and Jensen (1998), the potential difference between 
foreign-owned and domestically owned firms may be the result of industry, size, age, and 
location. By controlling for these four covariates, I hope to estimate a closer relationship 
between wages and foreign ownership. Additionally, I control for the capital intensity of a firm 
using the notion that multinationals tend to be the most capital intensive (Doms & Jensen, 
1998; Heyman et al., 2007). The last specification of the standard fixed effects equation is my 
choice to incorporate the lagged wage of the firm and observe the one and two-period leads.  
To conduct my treatment analysis, I match foreign firms with firms that have not 
received foreign investment. I utilize PSM developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
According to PSM, the probability of receiving FDI, which is the treatment, is based on the 
specified covariates. Therefore, the likelihood of receiving FDI for all firms is first calculated 
by using a probit model.  A firm belonging to the control group with the closest propensity 
score to a treated firm is the counterfactual. Since my current study is not randomized, the 
propensity score enables me to create a pseudo-randomized control group because these 
controls all have particular characteristics relevant to my study. This form of matching is quite 
common for impact evaluation studies as these findings are not done with participants like 
traditional studies that assign treatments themselves. For example, testing the effectiveness of 
a drug would be carried out by having some participants take a placebo to act as the control 
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group. Unfortunately, impact evaluation studies do not have this opportunity because I estimate 
what would have happened in the absence of the treatment, but I cannot assign the treatment 
randomly. Therefore, the treatment assignment is based on whether a firm is foreign-owned or 
not, and the outcome variable is the real wages of the firm. 
Before thoroughly covering the steps of PSM, the two key assumptions of matching 
ought to be understood and accounted for. The assumption of conditional independence states 
that the potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment after controlling for the 
confounding factors. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) represent this assumption with Equation 
(2), where 𝑑 is treatment status, 𝑋 is the set of covariates that have been controlled for, and 𝑦 
is the outcome variable. 
𝐸[𝑦1 ∣ 𝑋, 𝑑 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑦0 ∣ 𝑋, 𝑑 = 0] (2) 
The conditional independence assumption implies that the untreated observations can be used 
as an unbiased counterfactual for the treatment group. Additionally, the common support 
assumption states that the probability of receiving treatment is strictly between 0 and 1 after 
controlling for the covariates, which Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) represent as Equation (3). 
If this assumption is satisfied, the characteristics of treated and untreated are close enough for 
matches.  
0 < 𝑃( 𝑑 = 1 ∣∣ 𝑋 ) < 1 (3) 
I will now go step-by-step on how to formulate the propensity scores and evaluate them. 
The first step I take is to use a probit regression with foreign ownership, which is classified as 
0 for domestic-owned firms and 1 for foreign-owned firms, as the dependent variable and the 
confounders as the independent variables. Therefore, the selection of these explanatory 
variables is crucial for the validity of the study. According to prior literature, the covariates 
chosen should be those variables that affect the treatment and/or the related to the outcome 
variable (Brookhart et al. 2006). In my case, I ought to include variables that could influence 
the fact that a firm is foreign-owned and possibly those that affect employees’ wages. 
According to Barrowman et al. (2019), a confounder that is not accounted for will likely bias 
the treatment effect in the impact evaluation study. An important caveat is that including 
irrelevant explanatory variables can reduce bias (Imbens, 2004). If a researcher includes a 
covariate that influences the treatment but fails to affect the outcome, he or she does not reduce 
bias because this variable does not need to be controlled for (Brookhart et al., 2006). According 
to Imbens (2004), explanatory variables affected by the treatment should be excluded from the 
analysis. If these variables were included, the treatment effect that would be estimated in 
accordance with the propensity score would be biased. Additionally, Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
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assert that confounders with perfect collinearity with the treatment cannot be used because this 
covariate cannot produce a control group of the untreated. Lastly, I may be forced to omit 
independent variables if they are perfectly collinear with other covariates. Therefore, carefully 
choosing the correct covariates is crucial for estimating the propensity scores in order to reduce 
bias and estimate the accurate treatment effect. The selected covariates are based on prior 
literature and the readily available data provided to me.  
My data source for the panel of all firms operating in Estonia is the Estonian Business 
Registry, which includes data from 1995 until 2018. I will emphasize the importance of 
particular variables because these play a crucial role in the study of FDI on wages. Similar to 
Feliciano and Lipsey (2006), I will differentiate the manufacturing and services sectors. To 
further build upon this concept, I have further segregated firms based on how intensive the 
sector uses technology or knowledge for manufacturing and services sectors. Using NACE 
Rev.2, I indicate two levels of technology intensity and two levels of knowledge intensity. 
Therefore, special importance is placed on the specific sectors when matching the treated to 
their controls because the sector-specific characteristics have been seen to largely affect where 
the FDI is invested (Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; Pittiglio et al., 2015). Hale and Long (2011) 
acknowledge the importance of sector characteristics when creating their instruments, but they 
also consider firms’ location. As suggested by prior literature, the regional location of firms 
tends to also play a role in a firm receiving FDI, which is likely to do with other factors that 
are correlated with location (Girma & Görg, 2007; Vahter & Masso, 2007). Additionally, I 
utilize lags of variables to account for the possibility of foreign investors “cherry-picking” the 
most productive firms (Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004). The naturals logarithms of lagged variables 
that are employed are age, size, labor productivity, and capital intensity. The firm’s size is 
considered because the bigger firms may appear more attractive to foreign investors (Girma & 
Görg, 2007; Görg et al., 2007; Vahter & Masso, 2007). While including age and size, I include 
the squared lags to account for the likelihood that the relationship between these variables and 
foreign acquisition is non-linear. Additionally, the more productive firms and more capitally 
intensive firms may also attract these foreign investors (Görg et al., 2007; Peluffo, 2015). Labor 
productivity is measured as value-added per employee. Capital intensity is measured by the 
amount of capital relative to the number of laborers. By including these variables from the 
previous period, I eliminate the influence of the treatment. I specify Equation (4) to estimate 
the probit regressions for all periods, where the variables are the same as Equation (1) with the 
addition of 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  which indicates if the firm became foreign in period 𝑡 and 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 which represents the natural logarithm of value-added per employee at period 
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𝑡 − 1. These probit regressions enable me to create an artificial propensity score that accounts 
for the probability of a foreign takeover. 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡+𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1+𝐴𝑔𝑒²𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒²𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖),
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁
(4) 
After selecting the covariates and calculating the propensity scores, the assumption of 
common support must be checked to determine if the propensity scores are able to match for 
both groups, treated and untreated. According to Imbens (2004), the propensity scores should 
also balance between the treated and control groups. The standardized difference compares the 
mean of continuous and binary variables between the two groups (Austin, 2009). The 
standardized difference for a continuous variable is shown in Equation (5), where ?̅?treatment  and 
?̅?control  are the sample mean of the covariate in treated and untreated, 𝑠treatment 
2  and 𝑠control 
2  are 
the sample variance of the covariate in each group. 
𝑑 =
(?̅?treatment − ?̅?control )
√𝑠treatment 





For categorical variables, the standardized difference is given by Equation (6), where 




















According to Austin (2009), a standard difference less than 0.1 has been considered negligible 
between the two means. Therefore, the accounted for covariates would reasonably represent 
the treated and untreated groups and allowing the researcher to estimate the treatment effect. 
In addition to determining that covariates are balanced between treated and untreated 
groups after matching by a propensity score, I will describe the process of finding the actual 
matches of treated to untreated subjects. I utilize nearest-neighbor matching, which matches 
the treated observation to the untreated observation with the closest propensity score 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), nearest-neighbor 
matching does not automatically limit the acceptable difference between treated and control; 
instead, they describe nearest-neighbor matching with a maximum permitted difference 
between the two matched subjects called the caliper. This caliper prevents unfit matching from 
reducing bias. There has been little direction on the correct value of caliper. According to 
Raynor (1983), the relationship between the treatment and outcome variable reflects the 
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restrictiveness of the caliper. If the treatment is highly linked with the outcome variable, the 
caliper ought to be smaller. Additionally, the caliper can be made too small and force an 
inadequate number of matches, resulting in inefficiency and selection bias. For my matching 
procedure, I utilize a caliper of 0.05 to ensure that firms of the same sector and year are matched 
together in my 5-nearest neighbor matching.   
After I am confident in my selection of covariates and matching method, I complete the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). According to Ho et al. (2007), the ATT is of 
great interest because this represents the effect of treatment when the treatment is applied. As 
shown in Equation (7), the ATT is the average wage of the foreign-owned firms subtracted by 
the average wage of foreign-owned firms if they had not been foreign-owned, where 𝑌1𝑖 
represents the wage of the foreign-owned firm, 𝑌0𝑖 represents the wage of the domestic-owned 
firm, 𝐷𝑖 denotes the treatment assignment for a firm with 1 being a foreign-owned firm and 0 
being a domestic-owned firm, and 𝑋𝑖 denotes the controlled covariates for the firm.    
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖 ∣ 𝐷𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[{𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 ∣ 𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖 ∣ 𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 0]} ∣ 𝐷𝑖 = 1] (7) 
I estimate the ATT for the firm’s wages after one year of becoming a foreign-owned firm, and 
I also do the same for two years after the treatment occurs. 
After describing, in detail, the necessary steps to complete this study, I will discuss the 
software and commands used to complete my analysis. I use Stata to complete my standard 
fixed effects, matching, and ATT. Using the package -psmatch2-, I create matched pairs 
between the treated and control groups based on the propensity scores resulting from the probit 
regression that used the foreign ownership as the dependent variable with all the 
aforementioned covariates (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003). While this command is quite useful for 
performing this task of matching, there is a problem with an assumption in its code for 
calculating the standard errors. According to Leuven and Sianesi (2003), the -psmatch2- 
command assumes homoskedasticity of the outcome variable within both the treated and 
control groups. Abadie and Imbens (2006) demonstrate that this assumption for nearest-
neighbor matching estimators creates a bias in the errors. Instead, the standard errors need to 
be calculated with the Abadie-Imbens (A.I.) method matching two or more continuous 
covariates (Abadie & Imbens, 2006). Therefore, I include the necessary option on the -
psmatch2- command to correct for this bias, which would affect the ATT. 
The next necessary step is to use the standardized difference to check that the covariates 
have a reasonably close mean regardless of treatment assignment. I use the -pstest- command 
to conduct this balancing test, which calculates the standardized percentage bias (Leuven & 
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Sianesi, 2003). Additionally, the -pstest- command enables me to see the reduction in the bias 
of each covariate. 
4. Data 
As previously mentioned, I use the Estonian Business Registry, which includes data 
from 1995 until 2018 of 73,777 unique firms after removing missing data and outliers. The 
outliers were excluded based on the observation containing at least one key variable that is the 
lowest 1% or highest 1%, which excludes approximately 31,000 of approximately 430,000 
observations. This firm-level data includes an indicator that shows whether each firm is 
majority foreign-owned or not. In addition to this foreign ownership indicator, the data includes 
characteristics of each firm, such as size, sector, and real wages, based on the firms’ balance 
sheets. I use the natural logarithms of all the GDP deflated variables throughout this study, 
except for categorical variables like foreign ownership.  
Table 1 describes the means of some of the important variables that I will be working 
with. Wage is the natural logarithm of real wages that the firm paid. Age is the natural logarithm 
of the number of years that the firm existed. Size is the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees at the firm. Capital intensity is the deflated stock of capital relative to the number 
of employees. By including these descriptive statistics, I can view the basic characteristics of 
the sample. In addition to providing the means for each variable, I segregate the means of each 
observation based on the sector of the firm. According to Table 1, the mean of foreign-owned 
firms in each variable is higher relative to domestic-owned firms for each sector. Additionally, 
I observe that the highest mean wages are paid to workers at a foreign-owned firm operating 
in the services sector of the economy. 
These descriptive statics enable me to perceive the possibility that heterogeneity exists 
among the foreign-owned and domestically owned firms. To discern if the distribution of 
wages is the same for these two groups, the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 
conducted. According to this test, the distributions of wages are significantly different based 
on foreign ownership of the firm. This observation is also seen by the kernel density graph 
displayed in Figure 1. According to Figure 1, the peaks of the foreign-owned firms show that 
they have a denser concentration of higher real wages relative to the domestic-owned firms in 
each respective sector. This higher concentration gives reason to investigate the relationship 
between foreign ownership and higher wages. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the entire sample period 1995-2018 
          
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018  
 
Figure 1. Kernel density graphs with domestic-owned firms versus foreign-owned firms 
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018  
Using this data from the Estonian Business Registry, I estimate if foreign ownership 
results in higher wages. According to the aforementioned descriptive statistics, I expect foreign 
ownership to positively affect wages after controlling for confounding factors.  
5. Results 
To estimate the relationship between foreign ownership and wages for Estonian firms, 
I utilize standard fixed effects and PSM for the unbalanced panel data provided to me by the 
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Estonian Business Registry for 1995-2018. As mentioned earlier, the treatment is a foreign 
acquisition of a domestic, which is defined as a domestic firm becoming majority foreign-
owned. Additionally, I split the data into three eras of 1995-2003, 2004-2009, and 2010-2018 
since the type of FDI coming into Estonia may change. This section provides the estimations 
of all periods according to three different models, ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects 
(FE), propensity score matching (PSM). 
5.1 OLS model 
The OLS model is likely biased due to endogeneity, but this regression still gives an 
idea of the potential relationship between foreign firms and wages. For this model, I estimate 
the relationship between foreign ownership and wages rather than foreign acquisition, which 
will be estimated with the standard fixed-effects model and PSM. To correctly interpret the 
relationship between a dummy variable like foreign ownership and a natural logarithm like real 
wages, I utilize the method of Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). According to Table 2, a foreign 
firm pays approximately 70% higher wages on average, holding everything else constant when 
observing the entire sample from 1995-2018. Additionally, foreign-owned firms paying higher 
wages holds across all four types of industries. The narrative of a foreign wage premium also 
holds for all four eras covered, which are 1995-2018, 1995-2003, 2004-2009, and 2010-2018 
(Table 2; Appendix A). For Indonesian manufacturers, Sjöholm and Lipsey (2006) estimate a 
similar wage equation and approximate a foreign wage premium of 34% and 54% for 
production-worker and non-production-worker wages, respectively. Therefore, we estimate a 
larger foreign wage premium, but this may be a consequence of estimating the manufacturing 
and services sectors in this model. According to Table 2 and Appendix A, the services sector 
has the largest foreign wage premium in every era. The largest estimated gap between wages 
for foreign-owned and domestically owned firms is estimated to be the less knowledge-
intensive services from 1995-2003, during which foreign-owned companies pay about 110% 
higher wages than domestic firms. An important distinction of this OLS estimation is that it 
captures the approximate wage difference between all foreign firms and all domestic firms. 
Therefore, foreign firms that result from greenfield investments, which result from MNE 
creating subsidiaries in a host country, and foreign firms stemming from acquisitions are 
considered in this estimation. According to Heyman et al. (2007), the foreign wage premium 
is estimated to be larger for greenfield investments than the wage premium for foreign-owned 
firms arising from acquisitions. While useful, this OLS model tells a biased narrative because 
the model does not address the endogeneity problem of FDI. Since FDI is not randomly 
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assigned to firms, the results of these regressions are biased and lead me to consider the next 
method of estimating the relationship of foreign acquisition of a firm and wages in Estonia. 
Table 2 
OLS model for 1995-2018 
                                
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018  
5.2 Fixed effects model 
The standard fixed effects model controlling for time-invariant firm fixed effects 
enables me to estimate the relationship between foreign ownership and real wages within a 
firm. This model allows me to control for the fact that something within the firm may bias the 
results. Therefore, I estimate the effect of the foreign acquisition on wages while considering 
the firm’s characteristics. In this model, I control for the firm’s age, size, capital intensity, and 
previous year’s wage while estimating the firm’s wage for a one-period lead and a two-period 
lead. According to Table 3, I estimate that, for a given firm, foreign ownership significantly 
increases the real wages by 2.74% after a one-period lead for the overall sample of 1995-2018. 
Specifically, the less knowledge-intensive services appear to be the driving force of this wage 
premium because foreign ownership significantly increases the real wages by 3.56% after one- 
period. This fixed effect estimation may be supported by the results from the OLS estimation, 
which estimated that the less knowledge-intensive services had the largest magnitude for all 
three eras except 2010-2018. To investigate this further, I estimate the same fixed effects model 
for the eras 1995-2003, 2004-2009, and 2010-2018. As Table 3 shows, the period of 2010-2018 
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appears to be a driving force in this foreign wage premium because the model estimates a 
statistically significant increase of wages by 4.29% after one year of a foreign acquisition. 
Additionally, foreign firms that are less knowledge-intensive services pay a wage 4.71% higher 
after one year of being acquired. Meanwhile, the estimations for 1995-2003 and 2004-2009 
describe a different narrative, which is in Appendix B. According to the fixed effects 
estimations, these two eras lack a significant difference in wages for foreign and domestic 
firms. A possible explanation for these results stems from the nature of my data. Using firm-
level data prevents me from controlling for individual-level characteristics of workers. Linked 
employer-employee data could be used to control for the possibility of worker heterogeneity 
(Malchow-Møller et al., 2013; Vahter & Masso, 2019). This worker heterogeneity does seem 
to be prevalent in the Estonian workforce, as demonstrated by the Estonian gender pay gap 
(Vahter & Masso, 2019). According to the results in Table 3 and Appendix B, I estimate that 
the changes in average wages after acquisition have increased in recent years. Sjöholm and 
Lipsey (2006) estimate a similar sector level study by approximating the fixed effects of five 
Indonesian manufacturing industries since they claim that acquisitions are concentrated by 
sector. The progression of my analysis is to utilize treatment analysis with PSM to estimate the 
effect of foreign acquisitions on average wages at the firm level. 
Table 3 
Fixed effects model for 1995-2018 and 2010-2018 
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Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018  
5.3 Treatment analysis with PSM 
To study the effect of foreign acquisition, I implement PSM for 1995-2018, 1995-2003, 
2004-2009, and 2010-2018. Using 5-nearest-neighbor matching with a caliper, I match 
untreated firms, those not acquired by a foreign firm, with treated firms, those that we acquired. 
Table 4 shows the probability of a firm becoming foreign by estimating Equation (4) using a 
probit model. These estimated probit models enable me to complete my treatment analysis 
because the foreign-acquired firms are matched to the five nearest domestic firms in the same 
sector and year, which is ensured by creating an artificial propensity score that emphasizes 
sector and year. 
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Table 4 
Probit estimation of the probability of a firm becoming foreign-owned  
                         
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018 
Table 5 presents the estimated average treatment effect on the firms that were acquired 
by foreign firms for all four time periods; an example of the standardized percent bias across 
covariates is presented in Appendix C. Additionally, I estimate this same effect for the 
subcategories of firms based on their technological intensity and knowledge intensity. 
According to Table 5, foreign acquisition of an Estonian firm significantly increases the overall 
average wages of workers between 1995-2018 and for every subperiod studied. When 
observing the sample over the entire period of 1995-2018, I approximate that the foreign wage 
premium increases from about 14% to approximately 16% after one and two years of being 
acquired, respectively. During this period, the two firm types that experience this foreign wage 
premium are low-technology manufacturers and less knowledge-intensive services. By 
observing the subperiods of the sample, I estimate that the less knowledge-intensive firms are 
also paying this wage premium between 1995-2003 and 2004-2009. Meanwhile, the latest 
subperiod of 2010-2018 sees knowledge-intensive firms paying a wage premium of 18% and 
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21% after one- and two-years post-acquisition. Notably, the overall ATT of all types of firms 
is lowest between 2010-2018.  
Table 5 
PSM model for 1995-2018, 1995-2003, 2004-2009, 2010-2018  
 
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018  
5.4 Implications for the area of study 
I cautiously interpret the results of Table 5 as a signal that the inward FDI into Estonia 
has changed over time. According to Varblane et al. (2020), the productivity advantage of 
foreign-owned firms in manufacturing has lessened over the years. This productivity is thought 
to be the source of foreign wage premium (Aitken et al., 1996; Hale & Long, 2011). Therefore, 
reducing the productivity advantages of foreign-owned manufacturers might result in lessening 
any foreign wage premium. Additionally, past literature has focused heavily on the 
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manufacturing sector while neglecting the services sector, which may be more critical in 
former-socialist countries with undeveloped non-tradeable sectors (Köllő et al., 2021). 
According to the results in Table 5, I estimate that the less knowledge-intensive firms have a 
significant average wage premium for the two first eras of 1995-2003 and 2004-2009. Then, 
the knowledge-intensive firms have a significant average wage premium for the last subperiod 
of 2011-2018. These results potentially support the notion that the productivity gains in the 
knowledge-intensive sectors, such as financial and insurance activities, have become the focus 
of FDI. These findings also demonstrate that the literature on FDI’s effect on average firm 
wages should include the services sector. Furthermore, studies like Köllő et al. (2021) that 
group all services together without considering the knowledge intensity of the sectors 
potentially lose a critical facet to research. 
The current study is based on firm-level data, so I attempt to control for firm 
heterogeneity to some extent while examining the effects of FDI on the different types of 
manufacturing and services firms. A limitation of this study stems from the inability to 
control for the possibility of worker heterogeneity. Studies with linked employer-employee 
data, such as Malchow-Møller et al. (2013), can use worker fixed effects coupled with firm 
fixed effects to address endogeneity to some extent. As a possible future research design, I 
propose investigating how FDI affects wages throughout different sectors and intensities 
while also controlling for worker heterogeneity to some degree.  
6. Conclusions 
  According to this research, I estimate that the foreign wage premium varies by firm 
type and era. Using the notion that the three subperiods of this study capture different stages of 
the Estonian economy, I construct a study to compare the effects of the foreign acquisition on 
the manufacturing and services sectors. The OLS estimations capture the possible effects of 
foreign wage premiums of greenfield investments and foreign acquisitions. I attempt to address 
the problem of endogeneity to an extent with standard fixed effects and PSM. Therefore, I 
expect the estimated foreign premium to decrease when utilizing these methods. Additionally, 
I solely focus on foreign acquisitions when estimating the fixed effects and PSM models. 
According to Heyman et al. (2007), greenfield investments contain the largest foreign wage 
premium. Yet, greenfield investments have steadily decreased in Estonia since the global 
financial crisis; meanwhile, the number of mergers and acquisitions has increased (Durán, 
2019). Focusing on these acquisitions enables me to estimate how sector aggregations of 
technology-intensive and knowledge-intensive firms react to FDI. According to my results, I 
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approximate that during 1995-2003 and 2004-2009, acquired firms experienced a foreign wage 
premium associated with less knowledge-intensive services. This finding can be associated 
with the wholesale and retail trade surge during these periods (Köllő et al., 2021). Additionally, 
the foreign wage premium in knowledge-intensive services between 2010-2018 may indicate 
that Estonia is attracting less foreign investment in manufacturing and less knowledge-
intensive sectors because the level of development has increased since joining the OECD in 
2010 (OECD, 2012).  
 For further investigation into the relationship of FDI and wages in Estonia, I propose 
that the sector intensities be considered with employer-employee linked data. Having the ability 
to utilize worker fixed effects to some extent will be useful for this future study. 
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Appendix A 
OLS Models for 1995-2003, 2004-2009, 2010-2018 
  
              
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018 
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Appendix B 
FE Models for 1995-2003, 2004-2009 
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Appendix C 
Example of -pstest- to access the extent of balancing achieved after matching between 1995-
2018. 
 
Source: author’s calculations using Estonian Business Registry 1995-2018 
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Kokkuvõte 
Antud magistritöö uurib, kuidas välismaine omandamine mõjutab palkasid Eesti 
ettevõtetes. Kasutades Äriregistrist saadud Eesti firmade andmeid perioodil 1995 kuni 2018 
autor rakendab kalduvusskoori sobitamist ja argiseid fikseeritud mõjusid antud analüüsi 
sooritamiseks. Lõputöö eesmärk on lisada teadustööle, mis uurib suhet välismaiste 
otseinvesteeringute ja erinevate sektori klassifikatsioonide vahel, võttes samal ajal arvesse riigi 
majandusarengut. Tootmise ja teenuste agregaadid on NACE Rev. 2 klassifikatsiooni põhjal. 
Valimiperiood aastast 1995 aastani 2018 on jaotatud kolmeks kahe sündmuse puhul: Eesti 
liitumine Euroopa Liiduga 2003. aastal ja suur majandussurutis 2009. aastal. Nende elementide 
abil autor järeldab, et pärast välismaist omandamist filiaalide palgapreemiad erinevad nii 
tootmise ja teenuste agregaatide kui ka alamperioodide lõikes. Autor teadustab valimiperioodi 
lõikes, et esimesest alamperioodist viimaseni on filiaalide palgapreemiad langenud 5%. 
Tulemused samuti näitavad, et kõige hiljutisema alamperioodi lõikes vahemikus 2010-2018 on 
filiaalide palgapreemia teadmiste mahukates teenustes 21% kaks aastat pärast välismaist 
omandamist. 
Võtmesõnad: välismaine otseinvesteering, tõenäosuslik sobitamine, lähima naabri sobitamine 
JEL Classification: F23, J31 
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